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NOTES
CRIMINAL BATTERY IN PENNSYLVANIA
Section 708 of the Penal Code of 1939 provides:
"Whoever commits an assault and battery, or an assault, is guilty
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to
pay a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or undergo
imprisonment not exceeding two (2) years, or both."1
An initial observation of this enactment reveals that it contains no definition
of "assault" or "assault and battery" 2 with the result that the courts of Penn-
sylvania have applied the common law definition. At common law a battery was
a misdemeanors and was defined by Blackstone as "The least touching of an-
other's person wilfully, or in anger." 4 In addition, some reference has been made
to the definition of battery contained in the Restatement, Torts, § 18, as being
applicable to criminal cases.5 From an examination of the cases, however, a bat-
tery is best defined as the intentional or negligent touching of the person of
another without legal justification or excuse. "Assault and battery" and "bat-
tery" are synonomous, and the terms are to be distinguished from "assault"
which is merely an attempt with force and violence to do a corporal hurt to
another.6 The cases frequently use the term "assault" when speaking of an "as-
sault and battery" or a "battery"."
Like most crimes, battery may be readily divided into physical and mental
elements. To facilitate this discussion, these two elements will be further de-
fined: the physical element being an act causing a touching of the person of
another under circumstances rendering the touching unlawful; and the mental
element as being either the intent to touch another or carelessness as to whether
another is touched or not.8
The Physical Element Of Battery
The first requirement of the physical element of a battery is that some
act be committed or omitted. Although the question has not been litigated in
a criminal case in Pennsylvania, some willed physical activity or passivity would
seem to be required. Lobert v. Peck9, a tort case, presents a discussion of the
problem of tort liability for an act committed by a sleeping defendant. The
principles contained therein would appear applicable in determining the nature
of the act required for the commission of a criminal battery.
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4708 (Purdon 1939).
2 Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 97 A.2d 343 (1953).
3 Commonwealth v. Dunmire, 38 Pa. Super. 155 (1909).
4 Commonwealth v. Gregory, 132 Pa. Super. 507, 1 A.2d 501 (1938).
5 Commonwealth v. Gregory, note 4 supra; Commonwealth v. Bird, 152 Pa. Super. 648, 33
A.2d 531 (1943).
6 Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d 704 (1943).
7 Commonwealth v. Dooley, 6 Dist. 381, 19 Pa.C.C. 367 (1897).
8 The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable aid rendered by the outline of criminal bat-
tery prepared as a study aid by W. H. Hitchler, former Dean and Professor of Criminal Law at
the Dickinson School of Law.
9 337 Pa. 103, 9 A.2d 365 (1940).-
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The thing touched must be the person of another, although this does not
necessarily mean that the living body of the victim must be touched. Contacts
made with the clothes10 or a cane carried in the hand of the victim" have been
held sufficient. The means whereby the touching is effected varies as well, and
may be by the defendant's hand' 2 , his foot13, a club 4, an automobile' 5 , a beer
glass' 6, or a bullet fired from a gun 17. Early cases have held that the defen-
dant was guilty of a battery when the wheel of a carriage touched the pedal of
a bicycle ridden by the victim causing physical harm to him 8 or a thrown coat
struck the forefeet of a horse causing a jar to be transmitted to the rider'9 . The
variety suggests that the requirement is simply that the touching be accom-
plished by some agency set in motion by the defendant and the contact made
with some object capable of transmitting the physical shock to the body of
the victim, or so closely allied with his body as to be considered part of his per-
son.
Ordinarily, the degree of touching is unimportant, since the courts require
only the "least intentional violence, in ever so small a degree."2 0 However,
in cases.involving the corporal punishment of a child by a parent 2' or a school-
teacher22 and where the defendant acts in self defense23 the degree of touching
becomes important since only reasonable force is permitted. There is no need
for a distinct physical harm to the body of the victim.24
The touching must be unlawful or no battery is committed. Thus, where
the victim consents there is no battery25, but consent must be distinguished
from mere submission.2 6 The touching of another in defense of the person 27,
real28 or personal property29, in the performance of a legal duty such as an ar-
rest by a constable s0 or specially appointed policeman3 l , or while assisting a
10 Commonwealth v. Bird, 152 Pa. Super. 648, 33 A.2d 531 (1943); U.S. v. Ortega, 27 Fed.
Cas. 359, No. 15,971 (Wash.C.C. 1825).
11 Respublica v. DeLongchamps, 1 Dall. 111 (1784).
12 Commonwealth v. Gregory, 132 Pa. Super. 507, 1 A.2d 501 (1938).
13 Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 97 A.2d 343 (1953).
14 Commonwealth v. Stirk, 5 Lanc. Rev. 415 (1888).
15 Commonwealth v. Ireland, 149 Pa. Super. 298, 27 A.2d 746 (1942).
16 Commonwealth v. Roman, 52 Pa. Super. 64 (1912).
17 Smith v. Commonwealth, 100 Pa. 324, 12 W.N.C. 196 (1822).
18 Commonwealth v. Dooley, 6 Pa. Dist. 381, 19 Pa. County Ct. 367 (1897).
19 Commonwealth v. Fleet, 8 Phila. 614 (1871).
20 Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 137 Pa. Super. 511, 10 A.2d 90 (1939).
21 Commonwealth v. Blaker, I Brewst. 311 (1867).
22 Commonwealth v. Yalk, 30 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 173 (1934).
23 Commonwealth v. Sono, 98 Pa. Super. 347 (1929).
24 Commonwealth v. Gregory, 132 Pa. 507, 1 A.2d 501 (1938).
25 Commonwealth v. Shrodes, 354 Pa. 70, 46 A.2d 483 (1946).
26 Commonwealth v. Tuck, 169 Pa. Super. 35, 82 A.2d 288 (1941); Commonwealth v. Car-
penter, 172 Pa. Super. 271, 94 A.2d 74 (1953).
27 Commonwealth v. Mandarino, 23 Wash. County Rep. 6 (1941).
28 Commonwealth v. Moreland, 9 W.N.C. 272 (1880).
29 Commonwealth v. Emmons, 157 Pa. Super. 495, 43 A,2d 568 (1945).
80 Shovlin v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 369 (1884).
81 Commonwealth v. Jayne, 11 Pa. Super. 459 (1899),
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known public officer even if the latter acts without authority32 is not a battery
because the touchings in all instances have been held lawful. The relationship
between the parties may give the defendant the right to touch the victim, as
where a parent33 or a schoolteacher 34 disciplines a child.
The Mental Element
To constitute a battery the unlawful touching of another must be accom-
panied by the requisite mental element. The battery must have been intention-
al, not accidental or merely negligent.35 There is no requirement that the in-
tent be to injure a specific person, since the intent will be implied from the do-
ing of an act calculated to injure another.36 There is no battery if the touching
is done without the intention of inflicting a harmful or offensive contact. 37
The distinction has been clarified by the comparison of two situations. The
first is where one strikes another with his fist and knocks him down. This is
clearly a battery. However, if one slips on an icy pavement and in so doing falls
against another causing him to fall, there is no battery. The intent to hit anoth-
er is absent in this latter situation. 88
The intent to commit a battery may be actual and specific or it may be
implied from circumstances.39 An early case 40 indicated in dictum that a per-
son doing a negligent act could be convicted of a battery although he had no
intention of injuring another. The more recent cases indicate that intent is the
very gist of the offense and becomes a paramount problem in automobile in-
jury cases. The court may instruct the jury that the intent to injure may be
inferred from circumstances such as "the grossly negligent use of a potentially
dangerous instrument like an automobile, in wanton disregard of the safety of
others lawfully on the highway. .. "41 In the same case, the court said contri-
butory negligence of the injured persons is not a defense, but a circumstance
to be considered in determining the guilt of the accused, since it would absolve
the driver of the wilful or wanton disregard of the safety of others from which
the intent to injure could be inferred.42 There has been no mention by the
Pennsylvania courts of negligence from which intent will be presumed by law.
From the more recent cases, one can conclude that Pennsylvania requires an in-
tentional touching for a battery, but the jury may infer intent from grossly neg-
ligent behavior. 48
32 Commonwealth v. Sadowsky, 80 Pa. Super. 496 (1923).
Ba Commonwealth v. Blaker, I Brewst. 311 (1867).
34 Commonwealth v. Yalk, 30 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 173 (1934).
35 Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 97 A.2d 343 (1953).
36 Smith v. Commonwealth, 100 Pa. 324, 12 W.N.C. 196 (1822).
37 Commonwealth v. Gregory, 132 Pa. 507, 1 A.2d 501 (1938).
38 Commonwealth v. Ireland, 149 Pa. Super. 298, 27 A.2d 746 (1942).
89 Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 97 A.2d 343 (1953).
40 Commonwealth v. Fleet, 8 Phila. 614 (1871).
41 Commonwealth v. Ireland, 149 Pa. Super. 27 A.2d 746 (1942).
42 Commonwealth v. Ireland, note 41, supra.
48 For a more complete discussion of negligent criminal battery see The Negligent Criminal Bat-
tery in Pennsylvania, 53 DIcK. L. REv. 147 (1948-49).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
It is a general rule that if one voluntarily commits an unlawful act and in-
flicts personal injury he is criminally liable for such injury, but in some cases
a distinction is made between unlawful acts mala in se and merely mala pro-
hibita.44 There are no Pennsylvania cases discussing this point.
Conclusion
The elements of the crime of battery are relatively fixed and certain, the
most recent change being a certain -relaxation of the formerly strict requirement
of an intentional touching. However, by allowing the jury to infer intent from
gross negligence, the courts respond to present social needs and continue to
protect the individual from offensive contact.
SAMUEL J. SERATA
CEMETERY TRUSTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
Testator leaves property the income to be used for the care and maintenance
of a cemetery lot. Formerly the validity of such a provision was challenged on
the grounds that there were no beneficiaries and therefore no trust, and that in
any case, such provision violated the Rule against Perpetuities or the Rule
against Indestructible Trusts. In the United States generally and in Pennsylvania
particularly the validity of such provisions is no longer questioned. This note will
explain briefly how this position has been reached and will point up problems
still unresolved, especially in regard to provisions where the amount for the
care of a tomb is excessively large.
It is not within the scope of this note to consider exhaustively the Rule
against Perpetuities or the Rule against Indestructible Trusts. Suffice it to say
that the rules are aimed at the unreasonable continuance of restraint on aliena-
tion which is accomplished by the creation of various future interests.1 The
purpose of the rules is to preserve freedom of alienation, and to prevent re-,
strictions on the circulation of property. 2 In a number of instances, trusts of
indefinite duration for the maintenance or repair of private property not de-
voted to charitable uses, such as trusts for the perpetual care of cemetery lots,
have been held to have created perpetuities; but it seems that the term is used
in its sense of continuing interest, and the real basis for invalidity is want of a
beneficiary.8 Gray, one of the most prominent authorities on the rule, submits
that the rule is inapplicable to cemetery trusts. He argues that the Rule against
44 2 Burdick, Crime § 353 (1946).
1 10 AM. JUR., Charities, § 75 (1937).
2 Ryan v. Ward, 192 Md. 342, 64 A.2d 258, 7 A.L.R. 2d 1078 (1949).
8 Bliven v. Borden, 56 R.I. 283, 185 At. 239 (1936).
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